Title : Mapping Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) and BSL-4 laboratories to minimize public health threats
Abstract:
Introduction: Despite the global proliferation of Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3)/BSL-4 laboratories, global oversights of these labs working with high-risk pathogens need to be more cohesive. Laboratories are regulated differently in different countries, and potential laboratory accidents can be a public health threat. This study aimed to investigate the geospatial epidemiology of BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories and their correlation with country-level health security index and demographic variables to inform policymakers about the potential public health threats posed by poor oversights of these laboratories.
Methodology: Open-source data were used to collect the BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories worldwide. Further details of each laboratory, including the locations (i.e., latitude/longitude coordinates) and pathogens they are working with, were collected manually. The highest biosafety level was used to classify the laboratories as BSL-3/BSL-4. We mapped the geospatial epidemiology of BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories and their correlation with Country-level indicators collected from the World Bank, the Worldometer, and the 2021 Global Health Security Index Report using ArcGIS pro.
Result: We identified over 3,000 BSL-3 laboratories in 149 countries, most of which were found in the United States and Europe. Details on geolocations and pathogens they handled are publicly available for 955 of these labs. The United Kingdom had the highest rate (N=9) of BSL-3 labs per million population, while Bangladesh had the lowest. One-fifth of the BSL-3 laboratories are from low-income countries. All BSL-4 laboratories are from middle- and high-income countries, and nearly half (46%) of them are in the WHO’s Europe region. Notably, 91.6% of countries with at least one BSL-3 laboratory lack guidelines for dual-use research of concern. The United States and the United Kingdom had high health security index and BSL-3 count.
Conclusion and recommendation: High containment laboratories working with high-risk pathogens are unequally distributed by income level, population density, and health security index. More than 90% of the countries with at least one BSL-3 laboratory have no oversight/regulations regarding dual-use research. This may pose a high risk of laboratory-acquired infections/accidents that may cause public health threats. International registration and oversight may help to reduce these untoward effects.
